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Modern thought has always possessed as a distinctive characteristic a
kind of self-referential quality. The ancients didn't ask what it meant to
be "ancient" or inquire as to distinctively "ancient" problems. This is not
only because they were first and so incapable of distinguishing between
"ancient" and "modern," although they were and they could not (not in
the way we do, anyway). There is a directness about ancient thought that
connects it to life itself. We moderns are accustomed to looking at life
through the lens of a tradition and to distinguish ourselves from the past
in the process of measuring both the past and ourselves. We interpret
practice on the basis of theories that emerge from and against that
tradition of thought. And the self-referential quality of modern thought
is partly a function of the fact that the modern world has been so
powerfully altered in practice precisely by modern thought. But not all
of it, and not all of it to the same degree. In many respects theory and
practice sit in ambiguous relation to one another.
This is as true in jurisprudence as in philosophy more generally.
Bentham first distinguished between the student of jurisprudence as
expositor and censor, and this in the service of a self-conscious and
massively ambitious effort to modernize the law) It was Blackstone
against whom Bentham framed his project, a project that was indeed the
founding of modern analytic jurisprudence. This context is important to
keep in mind when taking up Steven Smith's Law's Quandary. Law's
Quandary has many virtues, not least its clear prose, lightly worn
erudition, and wit; but also its posing for us as a central question of
jurisprudence the gap between our theories and our practice in law. The
contemporary philosophical book that Law's Quandary brings to mind
immediately is Alasdair MacIntyre's now classic After Virtue.2 There
MacIntyre argued powerfully that our moral language is incoherent
precisely because in the transition to modernity what had been a
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coherent account of the moral life was rent asunder, leaving fragmentary
survivals, none of which could stand on its own as a fully defensible
explanation.
Law's Quandary can be read in some respects as exploring the state of
jurisprudence within the conditions described by MacIntyre in After
Virtue. In a sense, the book, notwithstanding some important
differences, might, therefore, be expected to become known as the After
Virtue of jurisprudence. At bottom, Smith's argument is that the
abandonment of what he calls the "classical" account of law, embodied in
diverse thinkers including Aquinas and-importantly for the founders of
the modern project, like Bentham-Blackstone, has left an "ontological
gap" between how we treat law in practice and what we think it is using
the language and concepts of modern philosophy and jurisprudence.
One can say that the shift in our larger views about the world and human
affairs related to the intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment and
modern science have deprived us of the concepts which traditionally
made practices that reach back into the premodern stage of our legal
system intelligible. Smith's conclusions, among the most important of
which is an injunction to practice a kind of renewed Socratic humility in
facing these perplexities, are less apocalyptic than MacIntyre's, not least
because of Smith's observation that in our legal practices we have not
followed suite with our professed academic convictions that abandon a
metaphysics of law. A source of this relatively more hopeful quality of
Professor Smith's vision may be found in Professor Joseph Vining's
observation in his symposium essay below that, in contrast to the
philosophy of a MacIntyre, which Vining would see as "unmoored to the
assent of individuals," "the force of law," Smith's specific concern,
orients itself to "the continuous unfoldingness of things and the reality of
the necessity of assent to characterizations of perception."3 In contrast to
philosophy, which "has been generated without any intrinsic connection
to outcomes in the world or responsibility for outcomes," Vining
observes that law "proceeds from the human imagination and creativity"
to be "brought to bear on a situation and the future emerging from it."
4
Put another way, the concrete connectedness to human affairs that is
definitive of legal thought, at least in the case of Professor Smith, may, in
that very concreteness, be uniquely able to provide openings for
postponing a kind of MacIntyrean Apocalyptic for measured present
hope.
The symposium papers which follow, with Dean Wagner's
introduction, are the outcome of an extraordinary symposium on Law's
3. Joseph Vining, Law's Own Ontology: A Comment on Law's Quandary, 55 CATH.
U. L. REV. 111-12 (2006).
4. Id. at 112.
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Quandary that took place at the Catholic University of America on
October 25, 2005. The symposium was sponsored by the Center for Law,
Philosophy and Culture, and the Catholic University Law Review. This
symposium was first conceived in conversations between my colleague in
the Catholic University Columbus School of Law, William Wagner, and
me, in which we explored the implications of Professor Smith's book
from our respective disciplines, philosophy, in my own case, and law, in
Dean Wagner's. In initiating those conversations, I had at first merely
hoped to gain an elucidation of the significance of Law's Quandary for
my own study of current options in jurisprudence, but as our
conversation proceeded it occurred to me that the topic was ripe for a
larger discussion. Dean Wagner readily agreed and so began our joint
effort toward the symposium, the fruits of which follow.
I know Dean Wagner joins me in expressing our gratitude to Professor
Steven Smith for occasioning this collaboration which Dean Wagner and
I have both found very rewarding, and which has further strengthened
the ties between our University's School of Philosophy and School of
Law. We would like to thank President David M. O'Connell, C.M. for
graciously agreeing to fund our project, the Board of Student Editors of
the Catholic University Law Review who co-sponsored the symposium
and have now so efficiently published these symposium proceedings, as
well as our respective deans, Veryl V. Miles (Law) and Kurt Pritzl, O.P.
(Philosophy), who have given us much encouragement and support in
our endeavor.
As you consider the viewpoints on Professor Smith's book that are
expressed in the essays that follow, we hope that you find yourself drawn
into a conversation transcending the particular issues of our symposium
and stimulated to search out and contribute to a revival in the state of
American discourse on basic questions in jurisprudence. Ours is not the
only scheduled academic conference on Professor Smith's book. Law's
Quandary has given a fresh jolt of energy to jurisprudential discussion in
the United States, and we are pleased to hope that by your reading and
thinking about the essays published here you may be encouraged to read
the book itself and thus take a place in the important conversation it has
initiated.
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
